Are Experienced Analysts More Accurate? by Fortin, Rich et al.
Journal of Business & Economics Research – August 2008 Volume 6, Number 8 
53 
Are Experienced Analysts More Accurate? 
Rich Fortin, New Mexico State University, USA 
James H. Gilkeson, University of Central Florida, USA 
Stuart E. Michelson, Stetson University, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the relationship between analyst experience and the accuracy of annual earnings 
forecasts using a 20-year sample (1983-2002) from the Thomson Financial First Call I/B/E/S 
database.  We test for this relationship using three different measures of forecast accuracy 
employed by prior researchers, which are regressed against measures of general experience and 
specific experience, along with five other controls, for four independent 5-year subperiods, as well 
as for the full 20-year period.  We find that general experience levels are positively associated 
with forecast accuracy (negatively associated with forecast error) in most subperiods for two of 
the three measures of forecast accuracy.  We also find, in contrast with the extant literature, that 
for two of the three measures of forecast accuracy and for most subperiods, specific experience 
does not have an association with forecast accuracy beyond that provided by the general 
experience measure.  Our results suggest that the relationship between forecast accuracy and 
analyst experience (as well as some other commonly examined analyst characteristics) is 
dependent on the measure of accuracy employed and the time period studied.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
hen you’re about to have open heart surgery, it’s comforting to know that your surgeon has 
performed the operation a hundred times.  The surgeon has “seen it all” and will know the procedure 
and what to do if something goes wrong.  In the same vein, when you’re selling a house, it seems 
natural to hire a realtor who has been selling houses in your neighborhood for years.  Such a professional will know 
how to price and market your house and how to deal with difficult buyers and their realtors.  Whether you call it 
experience, know-how, job tenure or specific human capital, the idea is the same: first, that practicing difficult tasks 
makes one better at performing them and, second, that market forces will, over time and on average, drive out 
incompetent performers. 
 
 Is the experienced surgeon, whose techniques were learned 20 or more years ago, really better than the 
younger one who is fresh out of a residency at one of the leading teaching hospitals in the country and knows the 
newest techniques?  Will the more established realtor put as much time and effort into marketing your home as a 
less experienced one with fewer clients and a greater need and desire to sell your house.  Upon deeper reflection, it’s 
not so clear what impact job experience will have on job performance. 
 
 What about securities analysts?  Is it reasonable to conclude that more experienced analysts are more 
reliable?  Or are more experienced analysts using older techniques?  Do they have closer relationships with the firms 
they analyze and does this closeness provide access to better or more timely information or does it create bias or 
conflict of interest?  Do experienced analysts have less need to prove themselves?   
 
 It is important to examine the link between analyst experience and analyst performance.  Investors and 
portfolio managers rely on the advice of analysts to make decisions about what securities to buy and sell or over-
weight and under-weight.  There is limited empirical evidence that earnings forecasts are particularly accurate in a 
quantitative sense; indeed, when Harris (1999) examined analysts’ estimates of long-term earnings growth rates, he 
concluded that, “on average…a superior forecast of long run earnings growth for individual companies can be 
W 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – August 2008 Volume 6, Number 8 
54 
obtained simply by assuming that average annual earnings growth will be zero.” (page 737.)  Despite this, the 
existence at any given time of thousands of well-paid analysts producing hundreds of thousands of earnings 
estimates each year, strongly suggests that many investors are paying attention.  We believe that those investors are 
interested in ways of knowing which of these thousands of analysts are likely to be more reliable and which of the 
number of competing earnings estimates for a particular firm are likely to be more accurate. 
 
 Our research addresses the benefit of experience by examining the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts of future 
earnings per share relative to both general experience, measured as the number of years the analyst has been 
forecasting earnings for any firm(s), and specific experience, measured as the number of years the analyst has been 
forecasting earnings for the particular firm.  Our 20-year sample, from the Thomson First Call Institutional Brokers 
Estimates System database, covering almost 16 thousand analysts and 15 thousand firms, provides some evidence 
that an analyst’s general experience matters – that analysts who have been in the business longer provide more 
reliable estimates.  We find only very limited support, however, for the value of specific experience – the idea that 
analysts who have been covering a particular firm longer produce more accurate estimates of that firm’s earnings.  
Further, in an expansion on prior research, we find that the relationship between analyst experience and forecast 
accuracy is not stable over time.   
 
 In addition, we examine whether more experienced analysts are more likely to produce conservative 
estimates; that is, estimates that are less than actual earnings.  Using a logistic regression analysis, we examine the 
relationship between producing a conservative estimate and analyst experience, but find limited evidence of any 
stable relationship. 
 
 The remainder of this paper is structured in the usual way.  In section 2, we provide a review of related 
literature and motivate our research.  In section 3, we introduce and summarize our data set, followed by a 
discussion of the tests we conduct.  Section 4 presents and discusses the results of those tests, while the final section 
provides concluding remarks and some ideas for future research. 
 
LITERATURE 
 
A complete review of the earnings forecast literature is well beyond the scope of any single paper.  As 
noted earlier, thousands of analysts are paid handsomely each year to produce hundreds of thousands of earnings 
forecasts, in addition to other information and analysis.  This suggests that market participants place value on these 
forecasts.  Beyond this, there is empirical evidence that analysts’ earnings estimates provide information beyond that 
provided by current earnings measures (e.g., Sougiannis and Yaekura, 2001.)  Further, Chopra (1998) shows that 
analysts’ forecasts have improved over time. 
 
 If there is valuable information in the average forecast, then it seems clear that there is greater value to be 
obtained by identifying those analysts who are (more likely to be) more accurate than others.  Indeed a substantial 
literature of this sort exists.  Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) show that useful analyst rankings can be obtained based 
on the timeliness of the analyst’s forecasts.  Sinha et al (1997), Brown (2001) and others show that an analyst’s past 
accuracy is positively related to future accuracy. Stickel (1992) argues that frequency of forecast issuance is a useful 
predictor of forecast accuracy and also finds that forecasts of analysts ranked as Institutional Investor All-American 
are more accurate than those who are not ranked.  Similarly, Fortin and Michelson (2006) show that analysts who 
hold the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation produce more accurate earnings forecasts than others.  
Clement (1999), in addition to examining the relationship between analyst experience and forecast accuracy, finds 
that forecast accuracy is positively associated with employer size and negatively associated with the number of firms 
and number of industries an analyst follows.  Brown and Mohd (2003) show that forecast age (how close to the end 
of the period the forecast is issued) can explain forecast accuracy as well as a model that includes forecast age, 
analyst experience, number of industries followed by the analyst, number of firms followed by the analyst, 
brokerage (employer) size, and forecast frequency. 
 
 A rich and complex literature exists that examines the relationship between job tenure or experience and 
job performance.  Christensen-Szalanski, et al (1983) provide a good review of the early literature, concluding that 
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most studies show that experience with a task improves a person’s performance, but that some show that 
“occasionally experience can bias an expert’s judgment,” (p. 278) “thus, experience with a task does not invariably 
improve a person’s judgment.” (p. 279.)  Christensen-Szalanski et al add to this set of exceptions by finding, in a 
comparison of physician and college students’ estimates of mortality rates from various diseases, that physicians’ 
estimates were better (i.e., expertise works) but that increased exposure to a disease leads to an upward bias in 
estimated mortality (i.e., increased familiarity with a subject can bias one’s judgment.)  In the context of securities 
analysis, this suggests that longer term experience analyzing a particular firm may not lead to better accuracy.  
Altering the cliché, it may be that familiarity breeds bias. 
 
 Nass (1994) also provides troubling results, finding that administrators in large organizations whose jobs 
require them to process information primarily learn knowledge (stored information, common to all) from job 
experience, rather than skills (process and procedures, possibly unique to the individual.)  In the context of securities 
analysis, much effort is taken to ensure that access to knowledge is uniform across market participants (e.g., public 
availability of SEC filings, regulation FD, etc.)  Thus, Nass’ work suggests that there is less value to be gained from 
analyst experience, if that experience leads only to an increase in knowledge and not skills.   
 
 On the other hand, in the context of audit judgments, Abdolmohammadi and Wright (1987) find that 
experience increases performance for unstructured (complex, possibly unique) and, to a lesser extent, semi-
structured tasks, but not for structured (simple) tasks.  This bodes well for the value of experience with respect to 
earnings forecast accuracy, as such analysis represents a complex, unstructured task.  Similarly, in the context of 
mutual fund management, Golec (1996) finds that, “the most significant [and positive] predictor of performance is 
the length of time a manager has managed his or her fund (tenure)” (abstract.)  In the context of hedge fund 
management, Maxam, et al (2006) see mixed results when studying the effect of experience, measured in this case as 
prior work experience, on fund performance. 
 
 Most closely related to this study, there are a number of papers that examine the relationship between 
experience and performance specifically in the context of the accuracy of analyst forecasts of future firm earnings.   
Mikhail et al (1997) studied a limited set of analysts – those who had provided at least 32 quarters (eight years) of 
earnings estimates for a particular firm – using forecasts of quarterly income from the Zacks Investment Research 
database for 1980-1995.  They find that forecast accuracy grows as an analyst’s experience in forecasting earnings 
for that firm increases and, also, that market participants appear to place more value on the forecasts of more 
experienced analysts.  They interpret their results as evidence of the “learning by doing” (human capital 
development) hypothesis. 
 
 Clement (1999) finds that forecast accuracy is positively associated with analyst experience.  Forecast 
accuracy is shown to be related to both general experience (the number of quarters the analyst has provided earnings 
estimates for any firm) and specific experience (the number of quarters the analyst has provided earnings estimates 
for the firm in question.)  In contrast with Mikhail et al (1997), Clement interprets greater experience as a proxy for 
greater inherent ability and skill rather than human capital development.  Clement’s study examines forecasts of 
quarterly earnings from the Thomson Financial I/B/E/S database for 1983-1994.  
 
 Jacob et al (1999) try to discern between analyst aptitude (native ability) and experience (learning-by-doing 
or human capital development) in an examination of earnings forecasts from the Zacks database for 1981-1992.  
They find, as have others, that specific analyst experience (the number of quarters for which the analyst has 
provided earnings forecasts for the firm) is positively related to forecast accuracy.  However, when they control for 
specific analyst/firm effects in the regression equations, specific analyst experience is no longer significantly related 
to forecast accuracy.  They interpret this as evidence that analyst experience as commonly measured is a proxy for 
survivorship bias and thus reflects underlying ability, rather than human capital (skill) development. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The analysts’ estimates of per share annual firm operating earnings that we examine in this study come 
from the Thomson Financial First Call I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimates System) U.S. Detail History 
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database.  The full file contains slightly more than seven million dated estimates made by 15,595 analysts regarding 
14,999 firms for fiscal years ending in 1983 through early 2003.  This includes many duplicate (consecutive) 
estimates by the same analyst for each firm/year pair; we look only at the last estimate made by a given analyst for a 
given firm for a given year.  The database also provides actual per share operating earnings for each year. 
 
 In contrast to most of the extant literature, we examine forecasts of annual earnings, rather than quarterly 
earnings.  We believe that annual earnings and estimates of them are more closely followed by market participants.  
This suggests to us that analysts will place more effort or emphasis on these forecasts. 
 
 The proper measure of earnings forecast accuracy is open to debate.  Because estimated earnings and actual 
earnings can be negative or positive or a mixture of both, we measure the absolute value of the difference between 
actual earnings and the last estimate of those earnings that was provided by the analyst.  This means that we are 
measuring absolute forecast error (AFE) not forecast accuracy.  We must keep this in mind when interpreting the 
signs of regression coefficients. 
 
 The scale of this difference will mean different things for different firms.  A $0.10 AFE means more if a 
firm’s share price is $10.00 than if it is $100.00; therefore, as our first measure of forecast accuracy (error) we 
divide the AFE by end of period share price (AFE/P) to create a relative measure of forecast accuracy.  This measure 
was employed by Mikhail et al (1997).  Jacob et al (1999) show that AFE/P can be decomposed into AFE/E × E/P, 
where E is actual earnings.  They show that the average AFE/P across analysts varies widely over time, but that this 
variation comes from variation in E/P (the inverse of the P/E ratio), which is a market pricing factor that is 
independent of earnings forecasts.  They show that the average of AFE/E across analysts, in contrast, is relatively 
stable from year to year.  Therefore, as a second measure of relative forecast accuracy, we divide the absolute 
forecast error by the absolute value of actual earnings (AFE/E).   
 
 In addition, some investors will be more directly concerned about the relative performance between 
analysts for a particular firm than the average performance relative to earnings or share price, therefore we construct 
a third measure of forecast accuracy equal to the absolute forecast error less the mean of the absolute forecast error 
of all analysts following the firm for that fiscal year divided by that mean ((AFE-avg)/avg).  Similar measures of 
relative performance have been employed by numerous researchers (e.g., Brown and Mohd (2003), Clement (1999), 
Jacob et al (1999), and others.)   
 
 We estimate otherwise identical cross-sectional regressions using the three measures of forecast accuracy 
discussed above.  Our tests are conducted initially over the full, 20-year sample period (1983-2002).  In addition, we 
divide the sample into four 5-year subperiods (1998-2002, 1993-1997, 1988-1992, and 1983-1987) and repeat our 
tests for each subperiod.   
 
 We are particularly interested in whether measures of analyst experience maintain a significant (and, we 
assume, positive) relationship with forecast accuracy over independent sample periods.  We measure analyst 
experience in two ways.  We measure general experience as the number of years during the sample period beyond 
the current year in which the analyst produced an earnings forecast for any firm.  For the full sample, general 
experience can take any discrete value between 0 and 19.  For each of the subperiods, it can take any discrete value 
between 0 and 4.  In addition, we measure specific experience as the number of years during the sample period 
beyond the current year in which the analyst produced an earnings estimate for the specific firm in question. 
 
 Our tests consist of cross-sectional regressions of forecast accuracy on general and specific analyst 
experience.  For the full sample period and each subperiod we include only one observation for each analyst/firm 
pair, using the last earnings forecast provided by the analyst for that firm during the last year of the sample period.  
For example, for the latest subperiod (1998-2002), we measure AFE as absolute value of the actual 2002 operating 
earnings per share less the last forecast of that year’s earnings provided by the analyst.  The analyst’s general 
experience and specific experience are measured over the 1998-2001 period.  The accuracy of analyst’s forecasts of 
1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 earnings (if available) are not considered. 
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 In related tests for the four subperiods and the full sample period, we examine the relationship between the 
likelihood of producing a conservative estimate (an earnings forecast that is less than the actual earnings) and 
analyst experience.  We use logistic regressions for the four subperiods and the full sample period with a dummy 
dependent variable equal to one if the earnings forecast is less than actual earnings for the period, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
 In our tests, in addition to these two measures of analyst experience, we employ five control variables.  The 
first is the number of firms for which the analyst provided an earnings forecast during the final year.  The second is 
the number of analysts who provided an earnings forecast for the firm for the final year.  The third is a dummy 
variable equal to one if actual earnings exceeded the analyst’s forecast (i.e., if the analyst’s estimate was 
conservative) and zero otherwise; we call this low estimate.  (Note: this is the dependent variable in the logistic 
regressions.)  The fourth is a dummy variable called positive earnings which is equal to one if actual earnings were 
positive and zero otherwise.  The fifth is a measure of the relative untimeliness or staleness (age) of the analyst’s 
estimate, measured as the number of days between the date of the analyst’s forecast and the date that the year being 
forecast ended, less the average of this number for all analysts following the firm in this year. 
 
Summary statistics for the three forecast variables, the two experience variables, and the five controls are 
provided in Table 1.  Panel (a) provides information for the full sample period, while panels (b) through (e) provide 
the same statistics for each of the four subperiods, from most recent to most distant.  Panels (a) and (b) differ only in 
the measures of analyst experience.  This means that tests of the full sample period (1983-2002) and the latest 5-year 
subperiod (1998-2002) consider the same analyst/firm forecast accuracy and the same values of the control 
variables, differing only in the value of the experience variables. 
 
 There is significant variation in all three forecast error variables.  For example, in 2002, the average 
absolute forecast error was approximately 9 percent of the firm’s stock price, but the standard deviation of the errors 
was 190 percent of stock price.  For the full 20-year sample period, analysts have, on average, provided earnings 
forecasts for approximately 6 years.  On average, analysts have provided earnings forecasts for the firm in question 
for only 2 years, so the average difference between specific and general experience is about 4 years.  On average, in 
2002, each analyst provided earnings forecasts for 18½  firms and each firm was followed by slightly more than 17 
analysts.  53 percent of forecasts were conservative (less than actual earnings) and 77 percent of actual earnings 
were positive. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 The results of our tests on forecast accuracy are provided in Table 2.  The second column of each panel 
provides results for the full sample period.  The third through sixth columns provide results for the four subperiods 
from the most recent (1998-2002) to the most distant (1983-1987). 
 
 Panel (a) provides regression coefficient estimates and their p-values when forecast error is measured as 
absolute forecast error divided by share price.  Overall, these results suggest that Jacob et al’s (1999) critique of this 
measure of forecast error has merit.  The explanatory power of each regression is very low; less than one percent.  
Analyst experience appears to have no relationship to forecast error, except for the negative relationship for general 
experience in the 1983-1987 and 1988-1992 subperiods.  In those two periods, more experienced analysts were 
significantly more accurate in their forecasts. 
 
 Of the control variables, neither the number of firms the analyst follows during the period nor the 
timeliness of the forecast are significantly related to forecast error.  The dummy measuring a low or conservative 
forecast (one that is below actual earnings) is significant for two of the four subperiods, but its sign differs across the 
two.  A conservative estimate is associated with larger forecast errors in the 1983-1987 subperiod and with smaller 
forecast errors in the 1993-1997 subperiod.  Only the number of analysts following the firm and the dummy 
indicating positive earnings are consistently (and negatively) related to forecast error, meaning a positive 
relationship with forecast accuracy.  That is, when more analysts follow a firm, estimates are likely to be more 
accurate and it appears that estimates for firms that have positive earnings are generally more accurate. 
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 Panel (b) provides regression coefficient estimates and their p-values when forecast error is measured as 
absolute forecast error divided by the absolute value of actual operating earnings for the year.  The explanatory 
power of these regressions is better than for the AFE/P measure of forecast error, but is still less than five percent for 
all subperiods.  
 
 Of particular interest for this study, general experience is negatively associated with forecast error 
(positively associated with forecast accuracy) for only one of the four subperiods and not for the full sample period.  
There is stronger evidence that specific experience leads to greater forecast accuracy, with a statistically significant 
negative relationship between specific experience and forecast error for two of the four subperiods and for the full 
sample period.   
 
 For the AFE/E measure of forecast error, all control variables are significant for the full sample period and 
have their expected signs – negative for number of analysts, low estimate and positive earnings and positive for 
number of firms and untimeliness.  All of these variables are significant and have the same signs in each of the four 
subperiods with two exceptions.  The number of firms followed by the analyst is positively associated with forecast 
error in the 1988-1992 and 1998-2002  subperiods.  In addition, the number of analysts following the firm is 
significant in all four subperiods, but in the earliest (1983-1987), it has a positive sign.   
 
 Panel (c) provides regression coefficient estimates and their p-values when forecast error is measured 
relative to the errors of other analysts (as the absolute forecast error minus the mean of the AFE of all analysts 
following the firm for that fiscal period ending date divided by the mean of the AFE of all analysts following the 
firm for that fiscal period ending date.)  The explanatory power of this specification is fairly high at about 33 percent 
for the full sample period down to a low of more than 12 percent for the 1988-1992 subperiod. 
 
 For this measure of forecast error, the significance of the control variables is very different than for AFE/E.  
Neither the number of analysts following the firm nor the dummy indicating positive earnings is significant over the 
full period or in any subperiod.  In contrast, the number of firms followed by the analyst and the untimeliness of the 
analyst’s estimate are both positively related to forecast error (negatively related to forecast accuracy.)  This means 
that analysts who follow fewer firms and analysts who release forecasts closer to the end of the period produce more 
accurate estimates.  The low (conservative) estimate dummy variable is also significant for the full sample period 
and three of the four subperiods (except the first, 1983-1997).  Its positive coefficient value suggests that analysts 
who are conservative (forecast < actual) produce less accurate forecasts relative to other analysts.  This is opposite 
the results in panel (b) when forecast error is measured as AFE/E and not relative to the performance of other 
analysts for the same firm’s earnings. 
 
 For the (AFE - avg)/avg measure of forecast error, general experience has a significant and negative 
association with forecast error (i.e., more experienced analysts are more accurate) for three of the four subperiods 
(1983-1987 excepted), but it is not significant for the full sample period (when general experience can range from 0-
19.)  Further, specific experience is negatively associated with forecast error in only two subperiods (1988-1992 and 
1993-1997) and not across the full sample period. 
 
 The results for our additional tests on forecast conservativeness (the likelihood of forecast earnings to be 
less than actual earnings) are provided in Table 3.  As shown, there is consistent evidence across the subperiods (and 
the full sample period) that analysts’ estimates are less likely to be conservative when actual earnings are positive 
and more likely to be conservative when the estimate is made further from the end of the period being forecast. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this study, we add to two bodies of research; a more general one that examines connections between past 
experience and task performance and a more specific one that examines the connections between the many 
characteristics of financial market professionals (including their prior work experience) and the quality of their 
work.  In particular, we examine the link between the job experience of securities analysts and the accuracy of the 
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earnings forecasts that they produce.  We employ a much longer sample period than prior studies (20 years, from 
1983 through 2002) and compare results across four non-overlapping subperiods. 
 
 We examine three measures of forecast accuracy that have been employed in earlier research.  We find 
evidence that the criticism made of one of these measures (absolute forecast error divided by share price) by Jacob et 
al (1999) has merit.  We also examine the joint impact of two measures of experience, general and specific.  We find 
evidence that experience leads to better job performance (better forecast accuracy), but this result varies and is not 
uniform across the distinct time periods that we study, nor is it uniform across different measures of forecast 
accuracy. The relationship is strongest for our second two measures of forecast accuracy (AFE/E and (AFE-
avg)/avg). 
 
 We also look at factors impacting the conservativeness of an analyst’s estimate (the likelihood that the 
earnings estimate will be less than actual earnings.)  General and specific analyst experience show an inconsistent 
relationship with conservativeness. There is consistent evidence that analysts’ estimates are less likely to be 
conservative when actual earnings are positive and more likely to be conservative when the estimate is made further 
from the end of the period being forecast.   
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
 
Panel (a): full sample (1983-2002)    
  standard   
variable mean deviation minimum maximum 
AFE/P 0.0898 1.9090 0.0 230.0 
AFE/E 0.3187 1.6044 0.0 101.0 
(AFE-avg)/avg 0.0000 1.0711 -1.0 20.7 
general experience 5.9455 5.5601 0.0 19.0 
specific experience 2.0552 2.9207 0.0 19.0 
number of firms 18.5957 72.5353 1.0 577.0 
number of analysts 17.1621 11.3680 1.0 61.0 
low estimate 0.5271 0.4993 0.0 1.0 
positive earnings 0.7698 0.4210 0.0 1.0 
untimeliness -0.0007 81.7219 -216.2 287.2 
     
     
Panel (b): 1998-2002     
  standard   
variable mean deviation minimum maximum 
AFE/P 0.0898 1.9090 0.0 230.0 
AFE/E 0.3187 1.6044 0.0 101.0 
(AFE-avg)/avg 0.0000 1.0711 -1.0 20.7 
general experience 2.8034 1.4902 0.0 4.0 
specific experience 1.4143 1.4463 0.0 4.0 
number of firms 18.5957 72.5353 1.0 577.0 
number of analysts 17.1621 11.3680 1.0 61.0 
low estimate 0.5271 0.4993 0.0 1.0 
positive earnings 0.7698 0.4210 0.0 1.0 
untimeliness -0.0007 81.7219 -216.2 287.2 
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Panel (c): 1993-1997     
   standard   
variable mean deviation minimum maximum 
AFE/P 0.0302 0.6575 0.0 83.4 
AFE/E 0.3512 2.8557 0.0 309.3 
(AFE-avg)/avg 0.0000 0.9200 -1.0 17.6 
general experience 2.8913 1.4302 0.0 4.0 
specific experience 1.5160 1.4953 0.0 4.0 
number of firms 15.6392 40.4869 1.0 393.0 
number of analysts 14.3847 10.6043 1.0 57.0 
low estimate 0.5228 0.4995 0.0 1.0 
positive earnings 0.8794 0.3257 0.0 1.0 
untimeliness -0.0040 75.6596 -201.6 288.2 
 
 
Panel (d): 1988-1992     
   standard   
variable mean deviation minimum maximum 
AFE/P 0.0417 1.8464 0.0 289.7 
AFE/E 0.4352 2.4262 0.0 109.5 
(AFE-avg)/avg 0.0000 0.8524 -1.0 13.7 
general experience 3.1637 1.0942 0.0 4.0 
specific experience 1.8875 1.4095 0.0 4.0 
number of firms 19.3363 41.7375 1.0 345.0 
number of analysts 16.1826 10.6748 1.0 48.0 
low estimate 0.4380 0.4962 0.0 1.0 
positive earnings 0.8894 0.3137 0.0 1.0 
untimeliness -0.0012 71.9249 -195.6 278.4 
     
     
Panel (e): 1983-1987     
   standard   
variable mean deviation minimum maximum 
AFE/P 0.3891 26.8936 0.0 2666.0 
AFE/E 1.3797 13.4955 0.0 574.0 
(AFE-avg)/avg 0.0000 0.8730 -1.0 20.5 
general experience 2.4681 1.5167 0.0 4.0 
specific experience 1.3449 1.4376 0.0 4.0 
number of firms 22.4082 63.0453 1.0 491.0 
number of analysts 20.6855 13.1686 1.0 54.0 
low estimate 0.4000 0.4899 0.0 1.0 
positive earnings 0.8725 0.3335 0.0 1.0 
untimeliness 0.0014 88.1412 -209.0 278.8 
 
 
Three measures of earnings forecast accuracy are employed, all based on absolute forecast error (AFE), which is equal to the 
absolute value of  the difference between actual operating earnings for the year (last year of the sample period) and the last 
forecast of those earnings provided by the analyst.  AFE/P is AFE divided by end of period share price.  AFE/E is AFE divided 
by the absolute value of actual operating earnings per share.  (AFE-avg)/avg is AFE less the average AFE for other analysts 
providing a forecast of the firm’s earnings for the year divided by that average.  General experience is the number of years 
during the sample period prior to the current year in which this analyst provided a forecast of any firm’s earnings.  Specific 
experience is the number of years during the sample period prior to the current year in which this analyst provided a forecast of 
this firm’s earnings.  Number of firms is the number of firms for which the analyst provides an earnings forecast during the 
current year.  Number of analysts is the number of analysts who provide an earnings forecast for this firm in the current year.  
Low estimate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the earnings forecast is less than the actual earnings (a measure of 
conservativeness) and 0 otherwise.  Positive earnings is a dummy variable equal to 1 if actual earnings are positive and 0 
otherwise.  Untimeliness is equal to the number of days between the end of the year for which earnings are being forecast and the 
date the forecast is made less the average of this measure for all analysts providing an earnings forecast for this firm and year. 
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Table 2:  Cross-sectional Regression of Forecast Accuracy on Analyst Experience 
 
(a) AFE/P (absolute forecast error / share price)    
  1983-2002 1998-2002 1993-1997 1988-1992 1983-1987 
general experience -0.0002 0.0109 0.0001 -0.0373 -0.2604 
  0.13 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.05 
specific experience 0.0008 -0.0040 0.0001 0.0068 0.1420 
  0.85 0.64 0.97 0.48 0.31 
number of firms -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 
  0.50 0.33 0.15 0.69 0.92 
number of analysts -0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0014 -0.0032 -0.0347 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
low estimate -0.0115 -0.0115 -0.0207 0.0196 0.6367 
  0.58 0.58 0.00 0.40 0.05 
positive earnings -0.3037 -0.3036 -0.15477 -0.2998 -0.57611 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 
untimeliness 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 
  0.13 0.16 0.19 0.44 0.84 
number of observations 35,151 35,151 37,855 26,578 29,608 
adjusted r-square 0.55% 0.55% 0.74% 0.32% 0.03% 
      
      
(b) AFE/E (absolute forecast error / absolute value of actual earnings)    
  1983-2002 1998-2002 1993-1997 1988-1992 1983-1987 
general experience -0.0031 -0.0080 -0.0475 -0.0133 -0.0099 
  0.11 0.25 0.00 0.39 0.88 
specific experience -0.0086 -0.0039 -0.0251 0.0087 -0.1232 
  0.01 0.58 0.04 0.49 0.08 
number of firms 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0014 0.0010 
  0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.43 
number of analysts -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0073 0.0713 
  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
low estimate -0.2230 -0.2228 -0.2068 -0.2513 -1.3478 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
positive earnings -0.4994 -0.5004 -1.0876 -1.3493 -1.0023 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
untimeliness 0.0023 0.0024 0.0018 0.0018 0.0066 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
number of observations 35,187 35,187 37,870 26,591 29,624 
adjusted r-square 4.10% 4.10% 2.14% 4.08% 0.95% 
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(c) (AFE - avg)/avg (absolute forecast error - average AFE of all analysts normalized by the average AFE of all analysts) 
  1983-2002 1998-2002 1993-1997 1988-1992 1983-1987 
general experience -0.0005 -0.0073 -0.0068 -0.0124 0.0092 
  0.63 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 
specific experience -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0127 -0.0112 -0.0067 
  0.94 0.80 0.00 0.01 0.11 
number of firms 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0003 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
number of analysts 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0005 0.0001 
  0.93 0.95 0.16 0.29 0.72 
low estimate 0.1018 0.1018 0.0776 0.0755 0.0033 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 
positive earnings -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0180 -0.0204 -0.0020 
  0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.89 
untimeliness 0.0075 0.0075 0.0046 0.0041 0.0036 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
number of observations 35,187 35,187 37,870 26,591 29,624 
adjusted r-square 32.71% 32.71% 14.31% 12.37% 12.96% 
 
 
P-values of coefficients appear below the estimate.  Coefficients that are significantly different from zero with 90 percent or 
greater confidence are in bold font.  Dependent variable in panel (a) is absolute forecast error (AFE) divided by end of period 
share price.  Dependent variable in panel (b) is AFE divided by the absolute value of actual operating earnings per share.  
Dependent variable in panel (c) is AFE less the average AFE for other analysts providing a forecast of the firm’s earnings for the 
year divided by that average.  Independent variables are identical across the panels: general experience is the number of years 
during the sample period prior to the current year in which this analyst provided a forecast of any firm’s earnings;  specific 
experience is the number of years during the sample period prior to the current year in which this analyst provided a forecast of 
this firm’s earnings;  number of firms is the number of firms for which the analyst provides an earnings forecast during the 
current year;  number of analysts is the number of analysts who provide an earnings forecast for this firm in the current year; 
low estimate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the earnings forecast is less than the actual earnings (a measure of 
conservativeness) and 0 otherwise; positive earnings is a dummy variable equal to 1 if actual earnings are positive and 0 
otherwise; and untimeliness is equal to the number of days between the end of the year for which earnings are being forecast and 
the date the forecast is made less the average of this measure for all analysts providing an earnings forecast for this firm and year 
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Table 3:  Logistic Regressions of Forecast Conservatism on Analyst Experience 
 
C (dummy = 1 if forecast earnings < actual earnings    
  1983-2002 1998-2002 1993-1997 1988-1992 1983-1987 
general experience 0.0033 0.0003 -0.0133 -0.0319 -0.0003 
  0.19 0.97 0.13 0.02 0.98 
specific experience 0.0058 0.0021 0.0258 0.0345 -0.0275 
  0.19 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.01 
number of firms -0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0004 
  0.58 0.98 0.15 0.02 0.07 
number of analysts -0.0029 -0.0028 0.0070 0.0045 0.0006 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 
positive earnings -0.5299 -0.5244 -1.1157 -0.9763 -1.8351 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
untimeliness 0.0022 0.0022 0.0015 0.0020 0.0004 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
number of observations 35,187 35,187 37,870 26,591 29,624 
percent concordant 56.8% 56.7% 57.5% 57.0% 57.0% 
 
P-values of coefficients appear below the estimate.  Coefficients that are significantly different from zero with 90 percent or 
greater confidence are in bold font.  Dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the forecast of earnings is less than the actual earnings 
and zero otherwise.  Independent variables: general experience is the number of years during the sample period prior to the 
current year in which this analyst provided a forecast of any firm’s earnings;  specific experience is the number of years during 
the sample period prior to the current year in which this analyst provided a forecast of this firm’s earnings;  number of firms is 
the number of firms for which the analyst provides an earnings forecast during the current year;  number of analysts is the 
number of analysts who provide an earnings forecast for this firm in the current year; low estimate is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the earnings forecast is less than the actual earnings (a measure of conservativeness) and 0 otherwise; positive earnings is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if actual earnings are positive and 0 otherwise; and untimeliness is equal to the number of days 
between the end of the year for which earnings are being forecast and the date the forecast is made less the average of this 
measure for all analysts providing an earnings forecast for this firm and year 
 
 
NOTES 
